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Chapter Two

CONTEMPLATION AND FINE WINE:
TASTING WITH SAINTSBURY,
SCHOPENHAUER, AND PATER

O

ne never knows when it will happen. I went to my cellar to choose an

accompaniment for a chestnut soufflé and a 1995 Domaine Huet Vouvray Clos du Bourg
Demi-Sec returned with me . Before opening that wine, I had a set of informed
questions...
Huet makes some of the best Vouvrays, so I expected a distinctly good wine. I
wondered how far the sweetness had softened over 19 years. How did it compare to
previous Huets or to wines from Champalou or Domaine des Baumard? Fully expecting to
be considering these and many similar questions, something completely different took
place. “Oh?” my wife murmured after her first sip. I knew from her tone she was
becoming immersed in the taste. I was simultaneously being pulled deeply into it. I was
not, as expected, noting the complexity of the bouquet or the depth of flavor or the great
match for the soufflé—observations that did eventually arise. Before they came forth an
intense experience of pure taste and pure smell filled my awareness. While clearly taste
and smell both were so fundamental that they transcended analysis or categorization.

Wanting to linger
When this experience occurs, I am always compelled to wonder, “What happened?”
Searching for ways to make sense of the experience has gradually led me to observe that
something similar happens in other situations. After a pre-concert lecture, I was prepared
to listen to the Shanghai Quartet performing Beethoven’s String Quartet No.15, Op.132.
Noting the expected astonishing transitions Beethoven created, I was suddenly no longer
hearing “superb musicians” or considering the tone of the “1600 Giovanni Paolo Maggini”
the first violin was playing; I was not even aware that I was hearing a Beethoven string
quartet. The sound completely filled my consciousness. I was “all ears,” as some say. I
recently purchased Ernest Koerlin’s still life gouache, Copy After Zurbarán of Francisco de
Zurbarán’s 1633 Still Life with Lemons, Oranges, and a Rose1. Zurbarán’s 1650 Still Life
with Pottery Jars2 (on title page) had, surrounded by so many superb paintings in the
Museo Nacional del Prado in Madrid, “taken my breath
away,” and now, years later, prompted the purchase of
this fine copy of the only other authenticated Zurbarán
still life. Paintings and music occasionally produce such
experiences. Might they tell us something about
Francisco de Zurbarán artist QS:P170,Q209615, Francisco de Zurbarán - Still-life with Lemons,
Oranges and Rose - WGA26062, marked as public domain, more details on Wikimedia Commons
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experiences like the one I had with that Huet Vouvray? In relation to visual art and music,
this experience is normally called contemplation. In attempting to understand what
happens in unique wine experiences, we can explore similarities to experiences of
paintings and music.
As I attentively examine these experiences, I begin to suspect that they are
fundamentally more similar than they are different. How they are similar, despite their
obvious differences, is complicated. On the one hand, all three are emphatically pure
sense experiences. They also have clear differences. A still life affects our sight but
provides almost no stimulus to any other sense, even if it portrays intensely sensuous
things like oranges, lemons, and a rose, as does the Zurbarán copied by my colleague
Ernest Koerlin. Wine significantly affects one’s senses of smell and taste, less so touch and
least of all sight. The sounds of poured wine and water are only subtly different. Music
reverses this list by affecting hearing most of all, sight and touch to diminishing degrees,
and taste and smell not at all. While affecting different senses, these experiences can also
share the kind of sense experience that takes place. Wine, like visual art and music, lends
itself to the opportunity for contemplation, and it is precisely contemplation that provides
the basis for the fundamental similarity we need to consider.
To be clear, while it is, indeed, possible (though not necessary) to think about visual
art and about music within the context of contemplation, contemplation is not normally
associated with the experience of wine. References to “wanting to linger” over a good
wine do occur, but these are infrequent. This might well be why I have long remembered
George Saintsbury’s3 statement about an 1848 Hermitage:
... this wine was so full and so complicated it never seemed to finish. You
could meditate on it; and it kept up with your meditation.” (Notes on a
Cellar-Book, 1920)
To meditate on a wine describes something quite precise about the
experience. In the simplest terms, meditation indicates taking
one’s time; it means lingering over the experience. Meditation,
contemplation, is a looking at, a considering attentively. The Latin
root, templum, names a special place designated for observation.
On the other hand, our normal experiences of tasting wine come in
numerous forms, based upon practical goals. Assessing which
wines we want to lay down involves a critical, comparative
(Olympian) ranking. This can be done with much sophistication, as
in the tastings in a magazine like The World of Fine Wine, or in
many more casual degrees. Many wine tastings involve
documenting similar taste and smell elements between wines and
other things: violets, herbs, and truffles, as well as Zurbarán’s
lemons, oranges, and roses. Making such lists is helpful in learning about wine and in
sharing experiences with others. Each of us can expand this list of normal experiences of
tasting wine. Let’s also note that looking at art or listening to music has parallel lists of
normal kinds of experience. We ask, “Who is the artist?” or “When was it painted?”
Contemplation of music or art occurs, in my experience, only on rare occasions.
Saintsbury thus encourages my odd questions: What does it mean to meditate on a wine?
What kind of experience is this? He gives us an element, the duration of taste, but this,
James Lafayette creator QS:P170,Q6137708, George Saintsbury Lafayette, marked as public
domain, more details on Wikimedia Commons
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too, can be one of our usual observations about fine wines. The task here is not to pursue
a well-known path despite its obvious usefulness and unending richness. My task now is
rather to ask questions that turn our attention toward better understanding what
contemplation of wine or music or art entails.

A deeper understanding of Being
A path to follow is in Chapter One Expect the Unexpected. For Kant, an aesthetic
judgment, what he called a “judgment of taste,” entitles us to consider something
universally beautiful. Such a judgment is based on a unique experience: the mental
activity of disinterested contemplation. Kant’s goal was to articulate the condition present
within our mental faculties that make aesthetic judgments valid. He found that experience
to be the free play of the Understanding and the Imagination. Having identified this basis
for making aesthetic judgments, Kant had fulfilled his task. He left examining the details
of the experience of the free play of the Understanding and the Imagination to us.
Fortunately, a follower of Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer4 (1788–1860), is more helpful in
providing insight about the nature of the experience of disinterested
contemplation. Schopenhauer includes in his 1818 magnum opus The
World as Will and Representation (WWR hereafter) an extensive
exploration of the arts and a corresponding discussion of the role
contemplative experience plays in our encounter with the various arts.
WWR is an ambitious work, wanting to explain in a complete
manner “what is,” what philosophers call Being. WWR begins with
describing the world as we experience it in our everyday lives. We act as
individuals engaged with particular things. This analysis draws upon
elements of Plato and Kant. For Kant and Schopenhauer, the cognition we
have of individual things produces knowledge of appearances
(phenomena). This is what Schopenhauer calls collectively the World as
Representation (first aspect). The computer with which I am writing this essay and the
desk on which it sits are two of countless individual things in my everyday world. We have
experiential knowledge of individual things, and we can have more organized, scientific
knowledge of the everyday world as well. Schopenhauer argues that we can also have
another, different kind of cognition of things in the world that is better understood in
relation to Plato’s Theory of Ideas. Each individual thing is an example of a multiplicity of
the same kinds of things. There are many computers in the world and many desks; the
computer and desk in front of me are but single examples. The most significant quality of
these individual things is that they are in a state of constant change. When I say that I
know what a desk is, I am saying that I not only know the desk at which I am sitting now
but also that I can distinguish other objects in the world as desks or not desks. I can even
determine whether an object seen for the first time is or is not a desk. What enables me
to do this is the presence in my mind, the cognition of, what Plato called the Idea of (a)
desk. Cognition of the Ideas of computer, cat, desk enable me to distinguish computers
from cats, desks, and the multiplicity of things in my everyday world. Cognition of Platonic
Ideas constitutes what Schopenhauer calls the World as Representation in its second
aspect. Knowledge of Platonic Ideas gives us a deeper understanding of Being.
The Third Book of WWR (§§30–52) contains Schopenhauer’s discussion of art. For
Schopenhauer, art directly involves cognition of the Platonic Ideas. The individual things
Schäfer, Johann, Arthur Schopenhauer by J Schäfer, 1859b, marked as public domain, more details
on Wikimedia Commons
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with which we occupy ourselves in our daily lives are for Schopenhauer fundamentally
different kinds of things from Platonic Ideas. The change from cognition of individual
things to cognition of ideas involves, he argues, a change both in the kind of object known
and in the subject who knows. As ordinary individuals, we have “interested” cognition of
individual things because they can fulfill our needs and desires. The desk in front of me is
a specific physical thing that fulfills my need for a place to hold my computer while I sit
and compose this chapter. To make the change from cognition of individual things to
cognition of ideas, there must also be a parallel change in the knowing subject. Both
changes are integral to our discussion of contemplation of the arts and of wine.
The change in the subject required to make cognition of the Platonic Idea possible
entails the abrupt ending of our usual pragmatic interaction with things. It is possible for
the mind to drop its usual concern for satisfying particular needs and to elevate itself and
become absorbed in the contemplation of the object presented. Schopenhauer insists that
this contemplation is constituted entirely by the use of one or more of our senses; it
remains purely perceptual. This contemplation is the free play of the Understanding and
the Imagination first described by Kant. Schopenhauer explicitly says that this does not
entail allowing abstract thought or concepts of pure reason to take control of our
consciousness. We lose ourselves in the pure perception of the object present. As
suggested earlier, such contemplation involves a space removed from the everyday—a
“temple” devoted to observation. It remains a place in that it is characterized by sense
perception, albeit of a unique kind. The losing of oneself in this radical change, becoming
disinterested, means the cessation of our normal perception of things that wants to make
use of them to fulfill our needs.
Schopenhauer acknowledges that this change in our consciousness is the exception
to our normal ways of perceiving things. Yet, the transition happens in relation to ordinary
things in our world like a landscape or a tree, a rock or a building. Sitting here in my
study, I can see out the window two sugar maple trees. My usual relation to them is
unquestionably practical. For much of the year, our house is kept comfortably cool by their
shade from late morning until sundown. When their leaves fall, I collect them in a leaf
composter that produces perfect mulch for our fruit trees. The trees, like my desk, fulfill a
number of regular needs. These trees can also, as Schopenhauer says, readily become
representatives of their Ideas. Their intricate, clear, determinate form can oblige us to
elevate our perception of them to perception of an Idea. This is particularly true now that
all their leaves have fallen. The object of aesthetic contemplation is not any individual
thing but rather an Idea striving for revelation. When we contemplate a tree aesthetically,
we are not contemplating this individual sugar maple tree, and neither is it the usual me
who contemplates. It is not even the spatial form before us that is being contemplated.
What is contemplated, Schopenhauer says, is the expression of the tree, its innermost
Being. Natural beauty has this capability to lift us above our usual self-interested
pragmatism that binds us to specific individual things we wish to use. We rise on special
occasions to a perception of Being.

The stairway of nature
While natural beauty can oblige us to make the transition to pure contemplation of
Ideas, the beautiful in art facilitates this transition, says Schopenhauer, far more
powerfully. WWR §36 argues that art is precisely a mode of cognition focused upon the
truly fundamental aspects of the world. Art arises from our intense perception of the
world’s appearances. Art presents the Ideas that underlie those appearances. Indeed, for
Schopenhauer the project of art is precisely to repeat the eternal ideas grasped through

pure contemplation. While Plato suggested that art was inferior because it merely held up
a mirror that makes copies of individual things (appearances), Schopenhauer considers art
a far superior mode of cognition. For Schopenhauer, art, as the predisposition to extract
from everyday things their inner Ideas and then to make them available for
contemplation, is the work of genius. And again, he insists that this contemplation is
entirely perceptual. This can be explored further by turning to Schopenhauer’s discussion
of the individual arts.
In considering the arts, Schopenhauer uses a hierarchy originating in ancient
Greece: The Great Chain of Being, or scala naturæ (stairway of nature). The Great Chain
is a progression of kinds of beings from the lowest level of matter (rocks, metals, and so
on), to plants, then animals, humans, and (for many, though not for Schopenhauer)
ascending still further to angels and culminating in God. In Schopenhauer’s version, steps
on this ladder of Being have corresponding arts. His artistic hierarchy begins with
architecture. Architecture serves our everyday needs and, in this sense, is not actually art
at all. Architecture can also, however, be a fine art that brings to clear perceptiveness
Ideas of the simplest kinds of Being: gravity, rigidity, hardness, cohesion, and reaction to
light. The universal qualities of materials like stone or wood become available to us for
contemplation through architecture. Contemplating architecture, says Schopenhauer,
makes possible the perception of the inner nature of Being and not just the outer surface.
The inner nature seen in this way includes discord between gravity and rigidity. In simple
terms, a building might be considered a lump of material clinging to the surface of the
earth via the force of gravity. Beams and walls resist gravity through the their rigidity.
Domes of cathedrals (Schopenhauer mentions St Peter’s and St Paul’s) strive toward the
earth via resisting pillars. The forces operating within stone or wood—and for us, in steel
and glass and countless other modern building
materials— become available for perception in
architecture. Architecture enables us to contemplate
these natural forces.
This contemplation of Platonic Ideas is facilitated most
fully in great works of architecture like St Peter’s and
St Paul’s. One has to wonder what Schopenhauer
might have said of the Crystal Palace5 that housed
The Great Exhibition of 1851. He lived long enough to
have seen it and did travel to London. He was not a
great admirer of modernity. Would he have
considered it a work of genius? One might be able to
contemplate the conflict between gravity and rigidity
in my university professor’s 70-year-old oak desk. It
would be easier to do this in my 110-year-old woodenframe house with its half-hip roof. Contemplating gravity and rigidity in Frank Lloyd
Wright’s Fallingwater6 brings the Ideas of the forces of
nature to far clearer perceptiveness.
The question we may now consider is whether
fine wine also provides an opportunity to contemplate
Frank Norton, Editor, Crystal Palace, London Exhibition, 1851 (Transept), Color adjusted by Charles
Taylor, CC0 1.0
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Ideas. Are there parallels in wine to gravity, rigidity, cohesion, hardness, or reaction to
light? Wine, more than architecture, is typically considered a practical part of our
everyday lives. As a useful thing, wine is part of the marketplace and is open to critical
and scientific investigation. Is there a parallel in wine to the conflict between the forces of
gravity and rigidity? What about the forces at work in the ripening of grapes? For
Schopenhauer, the most pervasive quality of Being that we contemplate in architecture is
conflict or discord between the forces of inorganic matter. The ’95 Huet Vouvray Clos du
Bourg that initiated this discussion had a bouquet and taste permeated with qualities of
wine made from a specific kind of grapes that ripen properly perhaps only in one place—
the middle Loire. The experience immediately rose to a different plane from that first clear
observation. The ripening of grapes to make wine of this quality involves the struggle and
discord of organic forces of nature, just as the steel beams and reinforced concrete of
Fallingwater involve the struggling forces of inorganic nature. The grapes that make a
Huet Vouvray never grow in the most favorable climate. Indeed, they must grow at what
is called the northern limit of the vine. Instead of having grown in conditions that produce
large quantities of ripe fruit, fine wines come from grapes that struggle with spring frosts,
inconsistent sun and moisture, diseases, variable harvest conditions, and/or other
challenges to achieve ripeness. The same Chenin Blanc grapes of the middle Loire are
grown in other locations around the world. Most of those locations are far more favorable
to ripening the grapes, and they produce distinctly generic wines. In the bouquet and
taste of a fine wine, it is possible to have a standard perception of ripened grapes. It is
also possible to perceive the underlying struggle of forces. In the ’95 Huet, there was a
singular smell and taste that was not derived from normal analytic perceptions of either
ripe grapes or a classic Vouvray profile. That taste made possible a perception of the
forces involved in the struggle to ripen grapes.
Schopenhauer points out that the conflict that reveals the inner nature of Being
appears in architecture in perfect distinctness when indestructible forces deprive each
other of the shortest path to satisfaction. Gravity is only indirectly able to achieve its
centripetal satisfaction through the intermediary of the rigid pillar; and likewise, rigidity
needs the vertiginous that it can resist. The more this conflict is prolonged, the more
clearly these forces become visible. The above-mentioned difficulties of plant growth are
prolonged over the growing season, and they are repeated with diverse variations
annually as well. This is particularly true of Chenin Blanc grapes ripening in the middle
Loire. Most of the time while tasting a wine, we are focused upon results caused by
specific climatic qualities, such as the extreme heat of the 2003 vintage in many parts of
Europe. The list of distinct causes of specific results is well known: frost, rain at harvest,
and so on and so forth. It is possible that on rare, unexpected occasions, wines can take
us beyond knowledge of specific conditions and allow us to taste and smell the forces
underlying these outcomes.

Understanding and Imagination
When we turn to other natural forces in plant life, perceptible conflicts multiply. In
order to have nourishing foods when fresh produce is unavailable, we have devised
diverse methods of preservation. The discovery of wine was probably an accidental part of
this practical wish. Someone, as the story goes, forgot grapes stored in a jar. Grapes can
crush themselves by their own weight, and the juice resulting can ferment by itself—with
the aid of wild yeasts necessary for fermentation that naturally grow on grape skins.
When this happens, the resulting wine would have an alcoholic content similar to
intentionally made wines because fermentation continues only until the alcohol reaches
±15%, at which point the yeasts are killed and fermentation stops. This wine would be

more palatable than the fermented juice of other fruits due to its balance of sugars and
acids. Whoever discovered wine this way had no idea of what had happened, except that
the resulting liquid had a second life of its own. Fresh fruit will lose its possibility of
nourishment and spoil rather quickly. The raisin or a jelly may prolong the conflict of
preservation and decay in grapes and thereby make the conflict perceptible for a longer
time. Wine can make this struggle available for perception for far longer.
The wines that invited me to linger have come most often from my own cellar. I
started laying down wines once I realized that the finest wines reward us with greater
pleasures if allowed to mature slowly in the bottle. As Schopenhauer would say, I have an
“interested” relationship to wine. I wanted to learn about variations from vintage to
vintage in wines from selected producers. Barolo became a primary focus, partially
because I was fortunate to have been able to taste numerous age-worthy vintages of the
late 1960s from fine producers such as Marcarini, Cordero di Montezemolo, E Pira, G
Conterno, and Bartolo Mascarello. When I opened a 1978 Poderi Aldo Conterno Bricco
Bussia Vigna Cicala in 2010, I had more expectations and questions than
I did of the Huet Vouvray. The first commercial Aldo Conterno wines were
made in 1971, and by the time this ’78 went into my cellar his reputation
was rapidly rising. Would it match up to my expectations, I wondered,
coming from such a good vintage and made after he had time to develop
his winemaking style? How did it compare to other mature Barolos? I
knew his style was reported to be a blend of traditional and modernist
approaches (as applied to wines of the 70’s and early 80’s). How did this
style compare to similarly made wines from Marcarini or Cordero di
Montezemolo, or to his brother’s or Pira’s more traditional wines? As I
sniffed and took my first taste, there were many such questions, and all of them were
eventually answered. However, I found myself immediately confronted by an extraordinary
bouquet and taste that did not lend itself to those questions. All I could do was let my
attention be filled by that taste and smell. My primary perception was not concerned with
vintage or producer or style or degree of maturity or evolution. Once again, I was
experiencing the free play of my Understanding and Imagination. What made that
experience possible was, I am inclined to say, the pure perception of the struggle of the
forces that ripen grapes and of the struggle of the forces that mature wine. The
coalescence of those forces, at that moment, produced taste and smell experiences quite
unlike the ones I had been expecting.

Entering the temple
As I have my own “discussion” with Schopenhauer about the taste of that ’78
Barolo, my questions evolve. How appropriately does Schopenhauer’s analysis of
contemplation of works of art translate to my experiences tasting wine? Does an elevation
actually take place—out of my usual experience of tasting wine and into a separate level
of disinterested contemplation? I have no trouble saying that this is, for me, quite an
accurate description of my experience with wine on occasion. It happens more frequently
with wines made by the finest producers from the finest terroir. The 32-year-old ’78 Aldo
Conterno Barolo Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala was easily recognized as one of the best
Barolos I had ever tasted. So good, in fact that I did eventually wonder if it was as good
as an ’82 Marcarini Brunate (discussed in Ch. One) or a ’71 Cordero di Montezemolo
Enrico VI; his brother’s, G Conterno’ ’7171 Barolo Monfortino Riserva Speciale or a ’71
from E Pira. The question, I realized, is a poor one. Equating or ranking wines of this
stature covers up how each is superb and unique. More interesting, however, is the fact
that not all of these “best Barolos tasted” made for an occasion in which I was elevated to

that very special contemplative experience. The ’71 Cordero di Montezemolo Enrico VI had
one of the most extraordinary bouquets of any Barolo I had tried. The experience of
tasting it was smelling a single example of “the best bouquet” of a wine, Barolo, that
perhaps excels most of all in its bouquet. The experience remained focused on that
extraordinary bouquet. The ’78 Aldo Conterno was the most complete assembly of
bouquet, complex taste, and long finish of any of these wines. But the taste experience
did not stop or even start there. That Aldo Conterno and one ’82 Marcarini Brunate
allowed me to enter the temple. If I were disposed to assign scores, I would rank all five
as 95+ wines, but that is based on an experience of a different kind from what I am
concerned with here.
A second question arises from this conversation with Schopenhauer. Does wine
sometimes present the inner forces of plant life for contemplation, as architecture
sometimes presents the forces of stone and wood for contemplation? What does one
contemplate in these experiences? Is it the inner nature of Being? This seems to be a
more complex question than the first about the experience of disinterested perception. For
Schopenhauer, the two parts of disinterested contemplation do not play an equal role on
each occasion. Rather, they occur in an equilibrium. Sometimes the release from everyday
interested cognition, and the elevation into disinterestedness, will be more important than
the Idea contemplated. When the Idea contemplated is more complex, the cognition of
the Idea will be more important. The Ideas contemplated in the Beethoven string quartet
are, for Schopenhauer, more complex (higher on the scala naturæ) than those in the
Zurbarán still life. Contemplating them would favor one or the other side of this
equilibrium. The Ideas of inorganic nature in architecture, and those of organic nature in
plant life, are at the lowest end of the scala naturæ. In contemplating Ideas from either,
release from everyday cognition would be more important than the Idea contemplated.
Contemplating the higher-level organic forces of nature is slightly more informative of the
nature of Being than is contemplating inorganic forces.
I was walking around my house, wondering about exactly what I am contemplating
in a fine wine, when I happened to glance out of a window at our garden, the orchard
behind it, and a recently harvested field beyond the orchard. It was just before sundown.
“Oh, the light is interesting,” I started to say to myself. This thought was immediately
replaced by, “It is light that I am seeing.” Usually I look out that window and see the
things in the garden, or things in the orchard, or what is growing in the field because of
the light. Almost always I am simply looking at the things present. I might note that I
need to cut the grass or water the tomatoes or that the soybeans had been harvested. But
when I found myself pulled into just “looking at the light,” I was seeing differently. The
paintings of JMW Turner can be described as incandescent. An inner quality of
candescence was very much a part of that visual experience. Light itself, as a force of
nature, as a force of Being, made itself available for me for contemplation. There seemed,
once again, to be much that was similar to those unusual experiences with wines.
Contemplating a ’78 Aldo Conterno Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala can indeed be similar to the
experiences that might happen looking at Fallingwater, a Turner, or the light in my garden.

The life in all flowing things
Grapes, it was noted above, transform themselves into wine and thus give a new
context to Schopenhauer’s claim that genius lets us see what nature endeavored to do but
could not because of inner conflicts. A winemaker such as Aldo Conterno lets us taste and
smell what nature intends when grapes transform themselves into wine. In fine wine, we

are able to apprehend what nature intended far more clearly. A third Idea—in addition to
growth and nourishment—which struggles for revelation through the contemplation of
wine, is precisely this self- transformation. In order to grasp the complexities of this Idea,
we might turn briefly to an essay by Walter Pater7, “A Study of Dionysus,” in Greek
Studies (1922). For Pater, the religion of Dionysus in ancient Greece was the religion that
developed among the people who spent their lives among grape vines. Writing as if he
had read Schopenhauer, Pater says that the name Dionysus
recalled for these ancient Greeks a body of flesh under a single
form (= Idea?), which comprehended its animating soul (inner
forces) in a whole of thoughts, surmises, and experiences (Pater,
10). This religion comes from the instinctive belief among people
at the early stages of a civilization that trees and flowers are
habitations of living spirits. More advanced peoples restrict this
belief to animals. For Pater, the religion of Dionysus is a faith
distinguished by grace. Nymphs are said to animate the lives of
plants; they nurse the vines by allowing an interplay of sun and
shade through spinning fine multicolored threads and then
weaving from them foliage or the petals of flowers or the skins of
the fruit (Pater, 12). He continues:
[Dionysus] is the soul of the individual vine first; the young vine at the
house-door of the newly married, for instance, as the vine-grower stoops
over it, coaxing and nursing it, like a pet animal or a little child; afterwards,
the soul of the whole species, the spirit of fire and dew, alive and leaping in a
thousand vines, as their higher intelligence, brooding more deeply over
things, pursues, in thought, the generation of sweetness and strength in the
veins of the tree, the transformation of water into wine, little by little; noting
all the influences upon it of the heavens above and the earth beneath; and
shadowing forth, in each pause of the process, an intervening person—what
is to us but the secret chemistry of nature being to them the mediation of
living spirits. So they passed on to think of Dionysus (naming him at last
from the brightness of the sky and the moisture of the earth) not merely as
the soul of the vine, but of all life in flowing things of which the vine is the
symbol, because its most emphatic example. [...] He comes at last to have a
scope equal to that of Demeter, a realm as wide and mysterious as hers; the
whole productive power of the earth is in him, and the explanation of its
annual change. As some embody their intuitions of that power in corn, so
others in wine. He is the dispenser of the earth’s hidden wealth, giver of
riches through the vine.” (Pater, 13–14)
I might see life in the sugar maple trees in my yard. But I can see it so much more clearly
in the vine, and most of all in wine. Brooding over the generation of sweetness and
strength in the veins of the vine is exactly what can occur in the contemplation of the
finest wine. The Idea one can contemplate easily in a ’78 Barolo Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala
is life as it appears not just in the individual wine but in all flowing things.

Unknown creator, Picture of Pater at Brasenose, marked as public domain, more details on
Wikimedia Commons
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